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Abstract	
The	physical	stumble	caused	by	stepping	onto	a	stationary	(broken)	escalator	
represents	a	locomotor	after‐effect	(LAE)	that	attests	to	a	process	of	adaptive	motor	
learning.	Whether	such	learning	is	primarily	explicit	(requiring	attention	resources)	or	
implicit	(independent	of	attention)	is	unknown.	To	address	this	question,	we	diverted	
attention	in	the	adaptation	(MOVING)	and	aftereffect	(AFTER)	phases	of	the	LAE	by	
loading	these	phases	with	a	secondary	cognitive	task	(sequential	naming	of	a	vegetable,	
fruit,	and	a	colour).	Thirty‐six	healthy	adults	were	randomly	assigned	to	3	equally	sized	
groups.	They	performed	5	trials	stepping	onto	a	stationary	sled	(BEFORE),	5	with	the	
sled	moving	(MOVING)	and	5	with	the	sled	stationary	again	(AFTER).	A	‘Dual‐Task‐
MOVING	(DTM)’	group	performed	the	dual‐task	in	the	MOVING	phase	and	the	‘Dual‐
Task‐AFTEREFFECT	(DTAE)’	group	in	the	AFTER	phase.	The	‘control’	group	performed	
no	dual‐task.	We	recorded	trunk	displacement,	gait	velocity	and	gastrocnemius	muscle	
EMG	of	the	left	(leading)	leg.	The	DTM,	but	not	the	DTAE	group,	had	larger	trunk	
displacement	during	the	MOVING	phase,	and	a	smaller	trunk	displacement	aftereffect,	
compared	to	controls.	Gait	velocity	was	unaffected	by	the	secondary	cognitive	task	in	
either	group.	Thus,	adaptive	locomotor	learning	involves	explicit	learning,	whereas,	the	
expression	of	the	aftereffect	is	automatic	(implicit).	During	rehabilitation,	patients	
should	be	actively	encouraged	to	maintain	maximal	attention	when	learning	new	or	
challenging	locomotor	tasks.			
	
	
Introduction	
	
Stepping	onto	a	broken	(stationary)	escalator	may	cause	a	stumble	and	an	odd	sensation	
(Fukui	 et	 al.	 2009),	 termed	 the	 ‘locomotor	 aftereffect’	 (LAE)	 (Reynolds	 and	Bronstein	
2003;	 Reynolds	 and	 Bronstein	 2004;	 Bronstein	 et	 al.	 2009)	 that	 results	 from	 prior	
adaptation	 to	 a	 moving	 escalator.	 The	 LAE	 occurs	 despite	 prior	 knowledge	 that	 the	
escalator	 is	 broken	 and	 will	 not	 move	 (Reynolds	 and	 Bronstein	 2003;	 Reynolds	 and	
Bronstein	2004;	Bronstein	et	al.	2009).	 Indeed,	 transcranial	direct	 current	 stimulation	
(tDCS)	 applied	 over	 the	 motor	 cortex	 before	 the	 adaptation	 task	 has	 been	 shown	 to	
enhance	the	LAE	(Kaski	et	al.	2012),	suggesting	that	the	aftereffect	relies	upon	cortical	
processing.	The	terms	‘adaptation’	and	‘motor	(skill)	learning’	often	fall	under	the	general	
term	 ‘motor	 learning’	 (Krakauer	 and	Mazzoni	 2011).	However,	 in	 this	manuscript	we	
refer	 to	 motor	 adaptation	 as	 an	 error‐based	 motor	 learning	 process	 occurring	 over	
minutes	to	hours	that	allows	modification	of	motor	strategies	to	maintain	motor	control	
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in	the	face	of	an	external	perturbation	(Bastian	2008),	and	differs	from	motor	learning	
which	is	a	higher	level	cognitive	process	that	involves	the	acquisition	of	a	new	motor	skill	
that	 takes	 longer	 to	 achieve.	 The	 expression	 of	 the	 LAE	 is	 best	 described	 as	 adaptive	
locomotor	learning,	with	repetition	resulting	in	better	performance	(motor	adaptation)	
as	well	as	the	formation/alteration	of	motor	strategies	(learning)	(Bastian	2008;	Taylor	
and	 Ivry	 2012).	 The	 acquisition	 and	 expression	 of	 motor	 skills	 necessarily	 involves	
different	 neural	 processes;	 acquisition	 relies	more	 upon	 attention	 resources	 than	 the	
expression	of	 a	 learnt	motor	 skill	 (Brashers‐Krug	et	 al.	 1996;	Shadmehr	and	Holcomb	
1997).			
	
Regarding	 the	experimental	 “broken	escalator”	paradigm,	one	unanswered	question	 is	
whether	attention	modulates	the	LAE.	In	other	words,	is	the	LAE	principally	explicit	(skill	
learning,	requiring	attention	resources)	implicit	(adaptive,	independent	of	attention)	or	
does	it	have	components	of	both?	Implicitly‐learnt	motor	strategies	are	less	susceptible	
to	dual‐task	interference	than	explicit	tasks	since	they	require	less	attentional	resources	
for	 their	 execution	 (Liao	 and	 Masters	 2001).	 Studying	 the	 LAE	 whilst	 imposing	 a	
secondary	cognitive	task	(i.e.,	dual‐tasking)	in	the	adaptation	(MOVING)	and	aftereffect	
(AFTER)	 phases	 allows	 us	 to	 address	 this	 question	 (Mazzoni	 and	 Krakauer	 2006).	 If	
implicit,	the	LAE	would	be	mainly	unaffected	by	dual‐tasking	because	adaptive	locomotor	
learning	 occurs	 even	 when	 attentional	 resources	 are	 diverted	 by	 the	 simultaneous	
cognitive	task.	If	explicit	and	attentional	resources	are	needed	for	the	cognitive	task	and	
for	adaptive	locomotor	learning,	locomotor	adaptive	learning	in	the	MOVING	phase	would	
be	significantly	reduced,	resulting	in	a	reduced	aftereffect.	We	thus	investigated	whether	
a	 secondary	 cognitive	 task	 (dual‐tasking)	 would	 affect	 the	 adaptive	 learning	 and	
expression	of	the	LAE.	We	hypothesised	that	dual‐tasking	during	the	adaptation	phase	
would	reduce	the	LAE,	but	not	when	dual‐tasking	during	the	expression	of	the	LAE.		
	
						
Methods	
	
Experimental	Procedures	
Subjects	
Forty‐eight	healthy,	naïve,	consenting,	adult	participants	were	recruited	from	the	student	
and	staff	at	the	local	University	Hospital;	age	ranges	were	18	to	39	(further	details	below,	
under	“Dual	Tasking”).	The	study	was	approved	by	the	local	ethics	committee.	
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Equipment	
Moving	sled	
The	computer‐controlled	linear	sled,	running	on	a	level	track,	was	powered	by	two	linear	
induction	motors	(Reynolds	and	Bronstein	2003;	Bronstein	et	al.	2009).	Sled	velocity	was	
recorded	with	a	tachometer.		
	
Movement	analysis	
Anterior‐posterior	upper	trunk	position	was	measured	using	a	FastrakTM	electromagnetic	
tracking	 system	 (Polhemus,	 VT,	 USA)	 sampled	 at	 250Hz.	 The	 movement	 sensor	 was	
secured	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	C7	 vertebra	 to	measure	 linear	 trunk	displacement	 and	 the	
transmitter	 was	 attached	 to	 the	 sled.	 A	 second	 wall‐mounted	 sensor	 recorded	 sled	
movement	in	the	MOVING	trials.	Step	timing	was	measured	by	contact	plates	on	each	foot	
and	corroborated	with	a	sled‐mounted	linear	accelerometer.		
	
EMG	activity	was	quantitatively	analysed	from	the	medial	gastrocnemius	(MG)	muscle	of	
the	left	leg.	This	is	the	first	leg	to	contact	the	sled	and	EMG	activity	responsible	for	braking	
(gait	 termination)	 is	 best	 visualised	 here	 (Bunday	 and	 Bronstein	 2008;	 Bunday	 and	
Bronstein	2009).	Signals	were	band‐pass	filtered	(10‐600	Hz)	and	sampled	at	500Hz.	
	
Procedure	
‘Broken	escalator’	paradigm		
	
The	 experimental	 sequence	 (Figure	 1)	 comprised	 BEFORE	 (5	 trials,	 stationary	 sled),	
MOVING	(5	trials,	moving	sled,	adaptation	phase)	and	AFTER	trials	(5	trials,	stationary	
sled,	 locomotor	aftereffect	phase).	Performing	5	MOVING	trials	produces	a	robust	LAE	
(Bunday	et	al.	2006;	Kaski	et	al.	2012).		
	
In	all	BEFORE,	MOVING	and	AFTER	trials,	subjects	stepped	 from	a	stationary	platform	
onto	the	sled.	All	subjects	began	by	standing	55cm	from	the	front	of	the	sled,	facing	the	
direction	of	movement.	The	motor	task	was	always	to	walk	forwards	from	a	stationary	
stance	prompted	by	a	single,	brief	auditory	cue	(beep),	step	with	their	right	foot	onto	the	
fixed	platform	and	then	onto	the	sled	with	their	left	foot	and	thereafter	stop	and	remain	
still	with	both	feet	in	line.		
	
In	the	MOVING	trials,	the	onset	of	platform	motion	was	triggered	by	breaking	an	infra‐red	
light	beam	when	the	subject	stepped	forward	from	the	‘start’	platform	onto	the	sled.	After	
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breaking	the	beam,	the	platform	moved,	with	a	600ms	delay,	and	travelled	a	distance	of	
approximately	 3.7m	 in	 4.2s;	 maximum	 velocity	 of	 1.4m/s	 was	 achieved	 at	 1.3s.	
Participants	were	 asked	 to	 avoid	 using	 the	 handrails	 unless	 absolutely	 necessary.	 On	
completing	the	MOVING	trials,	participants	were	given	the	following	information	“I	want	
you	to	step	onto	the	sled	as	before.	Only	this	time	it	is	not	going	to	move	and	the	motor	is	
now	going	to	be	turned	off.	The	sled	will	be	stationary	just	like	in	the	first	test”	–	and	the	
motor	was	ostensibly	turned	off,	indicated	by	a	key	turning	and	the	sound	of	the	running	
motor	ceasing.	Each	trial	lasted	16	seconds	after	which	the	participants	were	returned	to	
the	original	starting	position.	
	
Dual‐tasking		
	
The	secondary	cognitive	task	was	to	spontaneously	verbalise	names	of	vegetables,	fruits,	
and	 colours,	 in	 this	 order,	 prior	 to	 hearing	 the	 starting	 “beep”	 and	 to	 repeat	 the	 task	
sequentially	with	different	names	until	 the	end	of	 that	 trial	 (e.g.	 “carrot,	 apple,	 green;	
potato,	banana,	blue”	etc,	Figure	1).	Participants	were	asked	not	to	repeat	the	same	names	
used	in	a	previous	trial.	Fruits	were	defined	as	“sweet	and	fleshy	product	of	a	tree	or	other	
plant	that	contains	seed	and	can	be	eaten	as	food”	whereas	a	vegetable	is	“any	edible	part	
of	 a	 plant	 with	 a	 savoury	 flavour”.	 Where	 common	 ambiguities	 existed	 in	 fruit	 and	
vegetable	 categories	 (e.g.	 tomato),	 such	 responses	 were	 accepted	 as	 being	 correct.	
Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	three	equally‐sized	groups:	the	‘control’	group	(7	
females/5	males;	mean	age	25	years)	performed	no	dual‐task,	 the	 ‘Dual	Task	MOVING	
(DTM)’	group	(5	 females/7	males;	mean	age	25	years)	performed	the	dual‐task	 in	 the	
MOVING	trials	only	and	the	‘Dual	Task	AFTEREFFECT	(DTAE)’	group	(6	females/6	males;	
mean	 age	 22	 years)	 performed	 the	 dual‐task	 in	 the	 AFTER	 trials	 only.	 To	 establish	
baseline	values	for	performance	of	this	dual‐task,	12	naïve	subjects	(5	females/7	males;	
mean	age	28	years),	age	and	intelligence‐matched	to	subjects	performing	the	motor	task	
were	asked	to	perform	the	cognitive	task	only.	They	performed	five	trials,	each	lasting	
16s.	These	subjects	did	not	perform	a	motor	task	and	will	be	referred	to	as	the	‘Baseline’	
group.	
	
The	 responses	 were	 recorded	 in	 order	 to	 quantify	 verbal	 task	 performance.	 All	
participants	were	either	native	or	bi‐lingual	English	speakers.		
	
	
Analysis		
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All	locomotor	measurements	were	as	in	our	previous	studies,	where	further	details	can	
be	obtained	(Reynolds	and	Bronstein	2003;	Bronstein	et	al.	2009).	Foot‐sled	contact	was	
detected	 both	 from	 contact	 plates	 strapped	 under	 the	 feet	 and	 a	 sled‐mounted	
accelerometer.	Trunk	displacement	in	the	BEFORE	and	AFTER	trials	was	the	maximum	
forwards	deviation	of	 the	 trunk	 relative	 to	 the	mean	 final	 trunk	position	 in	 the	 last	 3	
seconds	of	the	trial,	providing	a	measure	of	the	magnitude	of	the	locomotor	aftereffect.	In	
MOVING	trials,	trunk	displacement	was	measured	as	the	maximum	backwards‐forwards	
(peak‐to‐peak)	displacement	after	stepping	onto	the	sled	(Bunday	and	Bronstein	2008;	
Kaski	et	al.	2012).	Gait	velocity	was	calculated	as	the	mean	linear	trunk	velocity	over	a	0.5	
second	period	prior	to	foot‐sled	contact.	EMG	signals	from	the	left	MG	were	rectified	and	
integrated	 over	 a	 500ms	 time	 frame	 after	 foot‐sled	 contact,	 and	 analysed	 as	 the	 area	
under	 curve.	 BEFORE	 trials	 3‐5	were	 averaged	 and	 used	 in	 the	 analyses	 (Kaski	 et	 al.	
2012).		
	
	
Cognitive	task	
	
We	calculated	the	total	number	of	words	spoken	during	the	entire	16s	recording	and	the	
total	 number	 of	 word	 errors	 (incorrect	 order,	 e.g.,	 fruit,	 vegetable,	 colour;	 word	
repetition;	or	a	word	unrelated	to	the	task).	For	the	latter,	an	Error	Percentage	(Brown	
1967;	de	Fockert	et	al.	2001)	was	calculated	thus:	Number	of	Errors/Number	of	Words	
spoken	x	100;	where	a	higher	value	would	correspond	to	a	higher	Error	Percentage.	We	
did	not	 observe	 any	 responses	where	 there	 existed	 ambiguity	 about	whether	 an	 item	
belonged	to	a	fruit	or	a	vegetable	category.	
	
	
Statistical	Analysis	
Due	to	the	different	time	course	of	the	motion	data	in	the	three	experimental	phases,	e.g.	
changing	markedly	as	a	function	of	trial	number	during	MOVING	trials	but	not	during	the	
BEFORE	 trials	 (see	 Figure	 2),	 the	 statistical	 approach	 consisted	 of	 performing	 three	
separate	ANOVAs,	one	 for	each	phase.	Separate	one‐way	ANOVAs	were	performed	 for	
BEFORE	and	AFTER	trials	to	evaluate	‘Group’	effects	(3	levels:	Control,	DTM	and	DTAE	
groups).	 	For	the	MOVING	trials	a	two‐way	full	factorial	ANOVA	(General	linear	model)	
was	used	with	factors	‘Group’	(3	levels,	Control,	DTM	and	DTAE)	and	‘Trial	number’	(5	
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levels,	trials	1‐5).	Additional	information	on	the	statistical	approach	for	each	condition	is	
presented	below.			
	
As	in	previous	publications	(Kaski	et	al.	2012)	for	the	BEFORE	condition,	trials	1‐2	are	
discarded	as	these	are	de	facto	practise	trials.	EMG	data	was	not	analysed	in	the	MOVING	
trials	 as	 it	 becomes	 very	noisy	 [1].	 To	demonstrate	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 aftereffect,	we	
compared	AFTER	vs.	 BEFORE	 trials.	 As	 the	 aftereffect	 is	mostly	 expressed	 in	 the	 first	
AFTER	trial,	we	compare	the	data	of	AFTER	trial	1	with	baseline	data	(i.e.	the	average	of	
BEFORE	 trials	 3‐5)	 using	 a	 one‐way	 ANOVA,	 as	 in	 previous	 publications	 (Kaski	 et	 al.	
2012).	This	statistical	approach	was	applied	to	all	motion	variables	(trunk	displacement	
or	‘overshoot’,	approach	gait	velocity	and	leg	EMG)	after	log	transformation.	
	
The	 performance	 of	 the	 Cognitive	 task	was	 assessed	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 error	 percentage	
(number	of	errors/number	of	words	spoken	x	100)	per	attempt.	A	two‐way	ANOVA	was	
used	to	evaluate	error	percentages	in	the	MOVING	(DTM	group),	AFTER	(DTAE	group)	
and	 baseline	 conditions,	with	 factors	 ‘Group’	 (3	 levels,	 baseline,	 DTM	 and	DTAE)	 and	
‘Attempt	number’	(5	levels,	1‐5).		
	
When	main	effects	were	present:	a)	‘Group’	x	‘Trial/Attempt	number’	interactions	were	
examined	and	b)	post‐hoc	tests	(Mann‐Whitney)	between	groups	were	applied.	For	all	
analyses,	P‐values	<0.05	were	considered	significant.	
	
Where	additional	tests	(Spearman’s	rank	correlation	coefficient)	between	variables	were	
applied	these	are	explained	in	the	Results	section.	
	
	
Results		
	
As	previously	(Reynolds	and	Bronstein	2003;	Bunday	et	al.	2006;	Kaski	et	al.	2012),	an	
aftereffect	was	observed	for	all	variables	(trunk	sway,	approach	gait	velocity	and	EMG)	
and	all	three	subject	groups.		This	was	confirmed	statistically	with	the	one‐way	ANOVA	
comparing	BEFORE	trials	3‐5	versus	AFTER	trial	1	for	all	variables	and	groups	(F	values	
range	5.5‐58.7;	P	values	range	0.029‐<0.001).	Apart	from	this	expected	effect,	our	main	
finding	was	an	increase	in	trunk	sway	during	the	MOVING	trials	and	a	reduction	in	the	
magnitude	of	the	trunk	displacement	aftereffect	in	the	DTM	group.	There	now	follows	a	
detailed	description	of	the	results,	displayed	in	Figures	2‐5.			
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BEFORE	trials	
	
Gait	velocity	in	all	groups	was	within	the	range	previously	recorded	for	healthy	subjects	
(Kaski	et	al.	2012)	and	accordingly	one‐way	ANOVAs	showed	no	main	‘Group’	effect	for	
gait	velocity,	trunk	overshoot	or	left	MG	EMG.	
	
	
MOVING	trials	
	
As	 expected,	 during	 the	MOVING	 trials	 all	 subjects	 approach	 the	 sled	 at	 a	 faster	 gait	
velocity	and	show	larger	trunk	sway	than	during	BEFORE	trials	(Figure	2).	Trunk	sway	
was	largest	in	the	first	MOVING	trial	in	all	three	subject	groups.	Trunk	sway	diminished	
during	successive	trials	in	all	groups	(Figure	2).			
	
For	 trunk	 sway,	 we	 investigated	 ‘Group’	 and	 ‘Trial	 number’	 main	 effects	 by	 two‐way	
ANOVA.	As	Figure	2	illustrates,	we	found	a	significant	main	‘Group’	effect	[F(2,146)=161,	
P<0.001].	Post‐hoc	statistics	showed	larger	trunk	sway	in	the	DTM	group	compared	to	
controls	(trial	4,	P=0.014)	and	in	the	DTM	group	compared	to	the	DTAE	group	(trial	4,	
P=0.049;	trial	5,	P=0.006).	As	seen	in	Figure	2,	the	DTM	group	had	consistently	greater	
levels	of	trunk	sway	in	all	trials	than	the	other	groups.	As	expected,	we	saw	diminished	
trunk	sway	during	successive	trials	as	subjects	adapted	to	the	moving	sled	(i.e.,	main	‘Trial	
number’	 effect,	 [F(4,	 146)=8.50,	 P<0.001]).	 The	 rate	 of	 reduction	 in	 trunk	 sway	 was	
similar	 across	 the	 groups	 (i.e.,	 no	 significant	 interaction	 between	 ‘Group’	 and	 ‘Trial	
number’).		
	
For	gait	velocity	(Figure	3),	we	investigated	‘Group’	and	‘Trial	number’	main	effects	by	
two‐way	ANOVA.	We	found	a	significant	main	 ‘Group’	effect	[F(2,	164)=7.25,	P=0.001].	
Post‐hoc	statistics	showed	faster	gait	approach	velocity	in	the	DTAE	group	compared	to	
controls	in	trial	1	(P=0.030);	this	was	owing	to	two	faster	walkers	in	this	group	[statistical	
significance	was	lost	on	removal	of	these	two	subjects].	There	were	no	significant	changes	
in	gait	velocity	with	successive	trials	i.e.,	no	main	‘Trial	number’	effect	or	‘Group’	x	‘Trial	
number’	interaction,	across	all	groups.			
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AFTER	Trial	1	
As	in	all	previous	studies	with	this	paradigm	(Reynolds	and	Bronstein	2003;	Green	et	al.	
2010;	Kaski	et	al.	2012;	Tang	et	al.	2013),	 the	LAE	was	present	 in	AFTER	trial	1	 in	all	
groups		We	investigated	‘Group’	differences	by	one‐way	ANOVA.	We	found	a	main	‘Group’	
effect	 for	 the	 size	 of	 trunk	 overshoot	 [F(2,35)=4.05,	 P=0.027]	 (Figure	 2).	 Post‐hoc	
statistics	 showed	 smaller	 trunk	 overshoot	 in	 the	 DTM	 group	 compared	 to	 controls	
(P=0.021).	 There	was	no	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	DTAE	 group	 compared	 to	
controls.	 No	 significant	 main	 ‘Group’	 effect	 was	 found	 for	 gait	 velocity	 (Figure	 3).	 A	
marginal	main	‘Group’	effect	was	found	for	Left	MG	EMG	[F(2,35)=3.22,	P=0.054].	EMG	
activity	was	discernibly	smaller	in	the	DTM	group	(Figure	4).			
	
Additional	 statistical	 tests	 showed	 that	 the	 reduced	 aftereffect	magnitude	 in	 the	DTM	
group	was	not	associated	with	slower	gait	velocity	in	the	MOVING	trials	(Spearman’s	rank	
correlation	coefficient=‐0.466;	P=0.128).					
	
	
Cognitive	responses		
	
The	cognitive	task	was	to	spontaneously	verbalise	a	series	of	categories;	“vegetable,	fruit,	
colour”	in	this	order.	The	task	was	scored	in	terms	of	an	error	percentage	per	attempt	(5	
attempts;	 error	%	=	 total	number	of	 errors/total	 number	of	words	 spoken	x	100).	As	
expected	with	 this	 cognitive	 task,	mean	 error	 percentages	 were	 smallest	 for	 the	 first	
attempt	and	increased	during	successive	attempts	(Figure	5).				
	
All	three	groups	verbalised	similar	numbers	of	words,	4.9	–	6.0	words	per	attempt	and,	as	
Figure	5	shows,		all	groups	found	the	task	progressively	difficult	(mean	error	percentages	
rose	 between	 attempts	 1‐5	 i.e.,	 a	 main	 ‘Attempt	 number’	 effect	 [F(4,	 165)=13.27,	
P<0.001]).	
	
A	 significant	 main	 ‘Group’	 effect	 was	 found	 [F(2,	 165)=30.24,	 P<0.001].	 These	 group	
differences	were	related	to	trial	number	as	shown	by	a	significant	interaction	between	
‘Group’	x	‘Attempt	number’	[F(8,	165)=2.17,	P=0.032].	Post‐hoc	statistics	showed	higher	
mean	error	percentages	in	the	DTM	group	compared	to	controls	(attempts	3,	4	and	5,	P‐
values	range	0.008‐<0.001)	and	in	the	DTM	group	compared	to	the	DTAE	group	(attempts	
3	and	4,	P‐values	range	0.002‐<0.001).	A	marginally	higher	mean	error	percentage	was	
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also	 seen	 in	 the	 DTAE	 group	 compared	 to	 controls	 (attempts	 1and	 3,	P‐values	 range	
0.038‐0.047).				
	
There	was	no	correlation	between	the	trunk	displacement	aftereffect	in	AFTER	trial	1	and	
mean	error	percentage	in	attempt	1	of	the	DTM	group	(Spearman	correlation	coefficient	
=	0.376,	P=0.229)	or	DTAE	group	(Spearman	correlation	coefficient	=	‐0.044,	P=0.892).	
Discussion	
	
We	 show	 a	 smaller	 trunk	 displacement	 aftereffect	 when	 dual‐tasking	 during	 the	
adaptation	(MOVING)	phase	of	the	‘broken	escalator’	paradigm,	but	not	during	the	AFTER	
phase.	Given	that	the	magnitude	of	the	trunk	displacement	aftereffect	is	a	reflection	of	the	
learning	process	during	the	MOVING	trials,	the	decreased	aftereffect	size	likely	reflects	
impaired	motor	adaptation.	
		
Contemporaneous	cognitive	tasks	can	affect	the	performance	of	a	primary	motor	task	if	
general	resources	are	shared	and	insufficient	to	complete	both	simultaneously	(Gresty	
and	Golding	2009).	Such	dual‐task	 interference	was	apparent	 in	subjects	performing	a	
secondary	cognitive	task	in	the	MOVING	phase,	manifest	as	both	greater	trunk	sway	and	
by	 a	 reduced	 LAE	 size.	 Hence,	 adaptive	 locomotor	 learning	 depends	 on	 appropriate	
attention	 resources	 and	 involves	 an	 explicit	mode	 of	 learning.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	
functional	 imaging	 studies	 that	 have	 shown	 activation	 of	 similar	 neuronal	 systems	
(dorsolateral	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (Holtzer	 et	 al.	 2011)	 and	 anterior	 cingulate	 gyrus	
(Shadmehr	 and	 Holcomb	 1997;	 Grossman	 et	 al.	 2002;	 Rosenthal	 et	 al.	 2009))	 during	
explicit	 motor	 learning	 and	 while	 performing	 cognitive	 characterisation	 tasks.	 In	
agreement	 with	 our	 current	 results,	 which	 suggests	 a	 cortical	 basis	 for	 the	 “broken	
escalator’	LAE,	is	our	previous	finding	that	the	LAE	is	enhanced	with	neurostimulation	to	
midline	primary	motor	and	premotor	cortex	(Kaski	et	al.	2012).	
	
Conversely,	the	expression	of	the	LAE	in	the	DTAE	group	(AFTER	trial	1)	was	unaffected	
by	dual‐tasking,	implying	that	resources	are	not	shared	between	the	cognitive	task	and	
the	motor	 task	 in	 the	 AFTER	 phase	 i.e.,	 an	 automatic	 (or	 implicit)	 expression	 of	 this	
adaptive	learning	response.	As	indicated	by	Schmidt	(2005)	“Automaticity	is	any	process	
which	can	be	performed	without	interference	from	a	mental‐task	involving	(conscious)	
information‐processing	 activities”.	 Once	 learnt,	 certain	 motor	 strategies	 are	 executed	
automatically	 (implicitly)	 (Voss	 et	 al.	 2008),	 hastening	 the	 response	 (Mazzoni	 and	
Krakauer	2006)	and	freeing	attention	resources	for	other	activities	(Malone	and	Bastian	
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2010).	Contextual	cues	presumably	dictate	whether	the	previously	learnt	motor	program	
has	to	be	released	(the	sled	or	escalator	may	move)	or	not	(a	solid	platform	or	stairs	will	
not	move)	(Reynolds	and	Bronstein	2004;	Fukui	et	al.	2009),	probably	through	an	internal	
probabilistic	 risk	 assessment	 (Green	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Breaching	 this	 contextual	 threshold	
releases	the	LAE	even	whilst	performing	a	secondary	cognitive	task.	Indeed,	introspection	
suggests	 that	 the	 LAE	 occurs	 in	 everyday	 settings	 on	 a	 broken	 escalator	 even	 whilst	
talking	or	on	a	mobile	phone.			
	
Although	the	rates	of	trunk	sway	reduction	in	the	MOVING	trials	was	similar	across	all	
groups	(see	trunk	displacement	in	Figure	4),	trunk	displacement	was	greater	in	the	DTM	
group	compared	to	the	DTAE	and	control	groups	across	all	trials,	similar	to	dual‐tasking	
on	 a	 split‐belt	 treadmill	 (Malone	 and	 Bastian	 2010).	 The	 smaller	 trunk	 displacement	
aftereffect	 observed	 in	 the	 DTM	 group	 may	 thus	 relate	 to	 a	 constant	 level	 of	 deficit	
induced	by	the	cognitive	interference	(analogous	to	a	DC	offset,	in	engineering	terms)	and	
reflect	reduced	adaptive	learning.	Thus,	dual‐tasking	did	not	alter	the	rate	at	which	the	
motor	 task	was	 learnt,	but	 rather	 introduced	an	offset	 in	 the	adaptation	performance.	
Such	a	dissociation	may	reflect	a	temporal	difference	–	the	rate	of	adaptation	may	be	less	
susceptible	 to	 cognitive	 interference,	whereas	 the	 retention	 of	 novel	motor	 strategies	
takes	longer	to	achieve,	and	may	be	more	readily	affected	by	a	secondary	cognitive	task.		
	
Unlike	the	trunk	displacement	aftereffect	in	the	DTM	group,	the	gait	velocity	aftereffect	
was	unaffected	by	dual‐tasking,	 supporting	 the	view	that	different	neural	mechanisms	
underpin	these	two	aftereffect	components	(Tang	et	al.	2013).	This	is	also	evident	in	the	
low	level	correlation	present	between	the	magnitude	of	the	trunk	displacement	LAE	and	
gait	velocity	LAE	(Bronstein	et	al.	2009).	 In	the	current	experiment,	DTM	subjects	had	
greater	trunk	displacement	amplitudes	once	upon	the	moving	sled	–	at	which	point	gait	
velocity	is	nil.	It	could	be	argued	that	our	cognitive	task	was	sufficient	to	interfere	with	a	
difficult	motor	task	(swaying	on	a	moving	sled)	but	not	to	modify	a	relatively	easy	task	
such	as	unperturbed	walking	(i.e.,	gait	velocity)	in	the	DTM	group.	It	is	usually	in	advanced	
cerebral	 dysfunction	when	 dual‐tasking	 (Beauchet	 et	 al.	 2009)	 interferes	with	 simple	
walking.	 Two	 subjects	 in	 the	DTAE	 group	walked	much	 faster	 than	 others	 during	 the	
MOVING	trials,	which	increased	the	group	average	gait	velocity	in	MOVING	trials	(Figure	
3);	the	variability	between	gait	velocity	in	the	MOVING	trials	and	magnitude	of	the	trunk	
LAE	in	all	groups	indicates	that	this	finding	can	be	disregarded.		
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Our	cognitive	task	 interfered	with	adaptive	 locomotor	 learning,	and	vice‐versa.	Poorer	
performance	of	the	cognitive	task	was	observed	in	the	DTM	compared	to	the	DTAE	group	
(Figure	5),	which	may	relate	to	task	prioritisation,	the	‘posture	first	principle’	(Lajoie	et	
al.	1993;	Yardley	et	al.	2001;	Gresty	and	Golding	2009).	In	dual‐task	experiments	of	upper	
limb	 motor	 adaptation,	 performance	 of	 a	 cognitive	 task	 governed	 the	 level	 of	 motor	
learning;	 subjects	who	performed	 the	 cognitive	 task	well	 had	 reduced	motor	 learning	
(Taylor	 and	 Thoroughman	 2008).	 Conversely,	 dual‐tasking	 can	 improve	 motor	
performance	in	some	tasks	(Goh	et	al.	2012),	perhaps	because	a	secondary	task	that	does	
not	compete	for	shared	resources	may	inadvertently	increase	arousal.		
	
Study	limitations	
The	interference	between	a	cognitive	and	motor	task	may	depend	upon	various	factors	
including	the	nature	and	difficulty	of	the	motor	and	secondary	cognitive	task	(Hemond	et	
al.	2010).	One	potential	confound	to	our	data	is	that	the	adaptation	and		LAE	expression	
processes	 have	 different	 levels	 of	 motor	 difficulty,	 perhaps	 leading	 to	 differential	
susceptibility	 to	 dual‐task	 interference.	 That	 the	 baseline	 group	 (cognitive	 task	 only)	
performed	 better	 than	 subjects	 in	 both	 DTM	 and	 DTAE	 groups	 (i.e.,lower	 error	
percentage)	suggests	that	the	motor	tasks	were	of	sufficient	difficulty	to	interfere	with	
the	cognitive	task	(and	vice	versa).	Although	we	cannot	comment	on	whether	differences	
in	 motor	 task	 difficulty	 could	 account	 for	 differences	 in	 the	 LAE	 during	 dual‐tasking	
between	DTM	and	DTAE	groups,	we	found	no	correlation	between	performance	of	the	
cognitive	and	locomotor	tasks.	
	
Secondly,	we	did	not	test	whether	other	cognitive	tasks	such	as	verbal	or	spatial	Stroop	
tests	(Barra	et	al.	2006),	Brooks	Matrix	tests	(Gresty	et	al.	2003)	have	similar	effects.	The	
advantages	of	our	chosen	dual‐task	are	that	it	allowed	Error	Percentage	scoring	(Schmidt	
2005)	and	was	increasingly	difficult	to	perform	without	errors.	Indeed,	our	cognitive	task	
was	of	sufficient	difficulty	to	produce	errors	in	a	baseline	group	that	did	not	perform	a	
dual‐task.	When	dual‐tasking,	cognitive	tasks	require	a	sufficient	degree	of	complexity	so	
as	to	influence	the	motor	task	and	vice	versa	(Chen	et	al.	2013),	features	apparent	in	our	
experiments	i.e.,	a	bi‐directional	dual‐task	interference	was	observed	in	the	DTM	group	
and	 cognitive‐task	 interference	 in	 the	 DTAE	 group	 but	 without	 interference	 of	 LAE	
expression.		
	
Conclusions	
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We	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 ‘broken	 escalator’	 paradigm	 involves	 an	 explicit	 mode	 of	
learning.	 An	 explicit	 mode	 of	 learning	 presumably	 offers	 flexibility	 to	 accommodate	
challenging	 environments	 (Torres‐Oviedo	 et	 al.	 2011)	 and	 multi‐task	 in	 day‐to‐day	
activities.		
	
Diverting	attention	during	the	MOVING	phase	of	the	‘broken	escalator’	paradigm	results	
in	a	reduced	LAE	size.	This	supports	previous	evidence	suggesting	cortical	involvement	
in	this	task	(Kaski	et	al.	2012).	However,	the	first	aftereffect	 is	not	subject	to	cognitive	
interference,	suggesting	that	the	degree	of	automaticity	is	greater	when	expressing	the	
aftereffect.	These	findings	may	be	clinically	relevant	for	locomotor	rehabilitation.	When	
learning	 new	or	 challenging	 locomotor	 tasks	 during	 rehabilitation,	 patients	 should	 be	
encouraged	to	maintain	their	full	attention	to	enhance	adaptive	locomotor	learning.			
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